2.5FA
[Dave Birch] 2FA is clearly important. But what kind of 2FA? At the moment, the "something you know" plus "something you have" version is in vogue, and a great many organisations have been rolling out tokens of one form or another. In the U.K., Barclays (to name but one) have already rolled-out 2FA to the mass market:
Gemalto announced it has passed the 1 million mark for Barclays customers using PINsentry, its cryptographic smart card reader. The bank started deploying its authentication program in July 2007 and since then not one PINsentry online customer has suffered fraud.
[From 1 million Barclays customer using smart card reader : SecureID News]
As I've said before, I'm a happy PINsentry customer, even though I know it doesn't provide total security. But it's a bit limited. I can't use it to log in to anything else: I'd much rather that Barclays offered a 2FA OpenID login using the PINsentry and then I could use my Barclays OpenID to log in not only to the bank but to any other sites that needed that kind of security (eg, the government). Simon Willison's excellent OpenID blogged alerted me to the fact that other people are already thinking in that direction.
Microsoft are accepting OpenID for their new HealthVault site, but with a catch: you can only use OpenIDs from two providers: Trustbearer (who offer two-factor authentication using a hardware token) and Verisign.
[From Simon Willison’s Weblog]
So OpenID/2FA is not only feasible, it's a good idea. But we don't want to end up with a 2FA necklace -- with the tokens from half-a-dozen banks plus eBay plus our corporate networks plus plus plus -- that we have to carry with us at all times and this could happen if banks and other service providers don't accept each other's OpenIDs in a rich enough way.

